Co-operation and conflict under hard and soft contracting regimes: case studies from England and Wales.

BACKGROUND: This paper examines NHS secondary care contracting in England and Wales in a period which saw increasing policy divergence between the two systems. At face value, England was making greater use of market levers and utilising harder-edged service contracts incorporating financial penalties and incentives, while Wales was retreating from the 1990 s internal market and emphasising cooperation and flexibility in the contracting process. But there were also cross-border spill-overs involving common contracting technologies and management cultures that meant that differences in on-the-ground contracting practices might be smaller than headline policy differences suggested. METHODS: The nature of real-world contracting behaviour was investigated by undertaking two qualitative case studies in England and two in Wales, each based on a local purchaser/provider network. The case studies involved ethnographic observations and interviews with staff in primary care trusts (PCTs) or local health boards (LHBs), NHS or Foundation trusts, and the overseeing Strategic Health Authority or NHS Wales regional office, as well as scrutiny of relevant documents. RESULTS: Wider policy differences between the two NHS systems were reflected in differing contracting frameworks, involving regional commissioning in Wales and commissioning by either a PCT, or co-operating pair of PCTs in our English case studies, and also in different oversight arrangements by higher tiers of the service. However, long-term relationships and trust between purchasers and providers had an important role in both systems when the financial viability of organisations was at risk. In England, the study found examples where both PCTs and trusts relaxed contractual requirements to assist partners faced with deficits. In Wales, news of plans to end the purchaser/provider split meant a return to less precisely-specified block contracts and a renewed concern to build cooperation between LHB and trust staff. CONCLUSIONS: The interdependency of local purchasers and providers fostered long-term relationships and co-operation that shaped contracting behaviour, just as much as the design of contracts and the presence or absence of contractual penalties and incentives. Although conflict and tensions between contracting partners sometimes surfaced in both the English and Welsh case studies, cooperative behaviour became crucial in times of trouble.

Embedding economic relationships through social learning? The limits of patient and public involvement in healthcare governance in England.

The strategy for NHS modernization in England is privileging individual choice over collective voice in the governance of healthcare. This paper explores the tension between economic and democratic strands in the current reform agenda, drawing on sociological conceptions of embeddedness and on theories of reflexive governance. Building on a Polanyian account of the disembedding effects of the increasing commercialization of health services, we consider the prospects for re-embedding economic relationships in this field. An analysis is provided of the limits of the present legal and regulatory framework of Patient and Public Involvement (PPI) in establishing the democratic and pragmatist conditions of social learning necessary for effective embedding. We show how the attainment of reflexive governance in the public interest is dependent on such conditions, and on the capacities of patients and the public to contribute to debate and deliberation in decision making, including on fundamental policy questions such as how services are provided and by whom.

The use of standard contracts in the English National Health Service: a case study analysis.

The use of contracts is vital to market transactions. The introduction of market reforms in health care in the U.K. and other developed countries twenty years ago meant greater use of contracts. In the U.K., health care contracting was widely researched in the 1990s. Yet, despite the changing policy context, the subject has attracted less interest in recent years. This paper seeks to fill a gap by reporting findings from a study of contracting in the English National Health Service (NHS) after the introduction of the national standard contract in 2007. By using economic and socio-legal theories and two case studies we examine the way in which the new contract was implemented in practice and the extent to which implementation conformed to policy intentions and to our theoretical predictions. Data were collected using non-participant observation of 36 contracting meetings, 24 semi-structured interviews, and analysis of documents. We found that despite efforts to introduce a more detailed ('complete') contract, in practice, purchasers and providers often reverted to a more relational style of contracting. Frequently reliance on the NHS hierarchy proved to be indispensable; in particular, formal dispute resolution was avoided and financial risk was re-allocated in compromises that sometimes ignored contractual provisions. Serious data deficiencies and shortages of skilled personnel still caused major difficulties. We conclude that contracting for health care continues to raise serious problems, which may be exacerbated by the impending transfer of responsibility to groups of general practitioners (GPs) who generally lack experience and expertise in large-scale, secondary care contracting.

Choice vs. voice? PPI policies and the re-positioning of the state in England and Wales.

UNLABELLED: CONTEXT AND THESIS: Changing patient and public involvement (PPI) policies in England and Wales are analysed against the background of wider National Health Service (NHS) reforms and regulatory frameworks. We argue that the growing divergence of health policies is accompanied by a re-positioning of the state vis-à-vis PPI, characterized by different mixes of centralized and decentralized regulatory instruments. METHOD: Analysis of legislation and official documents, and interviews with policy makers. FINDINGS: In England, continued hierarchical control is combined with the delegation of responsibilities for the oversight and organization of PPI to external institutions such as the Care Quality Commission and local involvement networks, in support of the government's policy agenda of increasing marketization. In Wales, which has rejected market reforms and economic regulation, decentralization is occurring through the use of mixed regulatory approaches and networks suited to the small-country governance model, and seeks to benefit from the close proximity of central and local actors by creating new forms of engagement while maintaining central steering of service planning. Whereas English PPI policies have emerged in tandem with a pluralistic supply-side market and combine new institutional arrangements for patient 'choice' with other forms of involvement, the Welsh policies focus on 'voice' within a largely publicly-delivered service. DISCUSSION: While the English reforms draw on theories of economic regulation and the experience of independent regulation in the utilities sector, the Welsh model of local service integration has been more influenced by reforms in local government. Such transfers of governance instruments from other public service sectors to the NHS may be problematic.

Schisms in the church: National Health Service systems and institutional divergence in England and Wales.

Since devolution, the four countries of the United Kingdom have pursued strikingly different National Health Service (NHS) reforms. While England created a supply-side market more radical than the previous internal market system, Wales moved to a softer version of the purchaser/provider split emphasizing localism. This article deploys institutional theory to analyze the forces shaping change, and describes the hybrid forms of economic organization emerging, including the economic regulation model implemented in England. The schism that has resulted in separate NHS subsystems warrants a different analysis from the more familiar phenomenon of infield divergence. We argue that schism was triggered by political-regulatory influences rather than economic or other social institutional forces, and predict that other decentralized public health care systems may follow a similar path. While political-regulatory, normative, and cognitive institutional influences push in the same direction in Wales, the misalignment of political-regulatory and normative elements in England looks set to result in a period of organizational turbulence.